Probably, one test of the stability of the banking system is to evaluate how risky assets are distributed across banks' portfolios and the implications for the contagion via interbank relations. This paper explores theoretically a bank sector with risks concentration and the functioning of interbank markets. It employs a simple model where banks are exposed to both credit and liquidity risk that suddenly correlate over the business cycle. We show that risk concentration makes interbank market breakdowns more likely and welfare monotonically decreases in risk concentration.
Introduction
A key feature of the 2007-2008 financial crisis has been the disruption and prolonged malfunctioning of interbank markets (see, e.g. Acharya & Merrouche, 2013; Afonso, Kovner, & Schoar, 2011; Ciccarelli, Maddaloni, & Peydró, 2013; Heider, Hoerova, & Holthausen, 2010 1 ) sometimes related to the interbank network structure (Georg, 2013 2 ). This has come as a surprise to most observers, since interbank markets have been functioning smoothly historically, even in the face of severe stress episodes such as the LTCM failure (Furfine, 2000) and it attaches importance to policy interest rate for loan portfolio risk and bank liquidity as recent found in Giulioni (2015) .
Theoretical research addressing why interbank markets may not function properly has provided explanations based on informational and market frictions such as: asymmetric information or market incompleteness (e.g. Acharya & Skeie, 2011; Flannery, 1996; Freixas & Jorge, 2008; Georg, 2013; Gale & Yorulmazer, 2012; Heider et al., 2010) ; information contagion where the poor performance of each bank conveys potential bad news about the common factor affecting loan returns (Acharya & Yorulmazer, 2008) ; market power (e.g. Acharya, Gromb, & Yorulmazer, 2012; Cai & Thakor, 2008) ; and malfunctioning secondary asset markets (e.g. Diamond & Rajan, 2005 , 2008 Gorton & Huang, 2004 , 2006 .
Since the early 2000s, however, there has been increasing evidence of a positive relationship between measures of systemic risk in major banking systems and bank concentration. 3 This evidence raises the question of whether the correlation of risks possibly induced by higher bank risk concentration could have a significant impact on the functioning of interbank markets and welfare, and if so, why. To our knowledge, this question has not been addressed in the literature. A recent study discuss the international portfolio diversification of Miralles-Marcelo, del Mar Miralles-Quirós, and MirallesQuirós (2015), but aside from the interbank market and the correlation between liquidity risk and credit risk.
Specifically, in this paper we explore the implications of banking system risk concentration for the functioning of interbank markets in a model where banks are exposed to both credit and liquidity risk. (2013) show that credit risk is pro-cyclical and default risk depends on structural features, underlining the banking regulation role in presence of credit and liquidity shocks.
The line of inquiry of this paper is related to, and builds on, the contributions by Ibragimov, Jaffee, and Walden (2011) and Wagner (2010 Wagner ( , 2011 , who show that inefficiencies may arise from individual bank diversification, which does not necessarily result in a more resilient banking system. However, these papers do not consider interbank markets and multiple sources of risks, such as credit and liquidity risk, as we do. 4 We build a simple model along the lines of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) models, where banks are exposed to both credit and liquidity risk, and there are no informational or market frictions. The market failure in our economy is that contracts are incomplete and therefore, not all risks can be insured. Interbank market breakdowns are defined as parameter configurations under which there is no interbank market equilibrium, and banks implement autarkic allocations.
We show that an increase in the concentration of risks, possibly arising from concentrated market structures, makes interbank markets breakdowns more likely. Differing from the previous literature, our results are not driven by asymmetric information, market power or dysfunctional secondary markets. Rather, they are explained by credit and liquidity risks correlation as suddenly happens over the business cycle. As an example, the ability to diversify these risks may be prevented by risk management diseconomies associated with large sizes of financial institutions and the wide scope and complexity of their activities. Indeed, systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) are seen as institutions
